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Medical Care Financing Problem 
David M. Cutler 
Virtually all developed countries are worried about how to finance medical 
care. Medical costs are increasing more rapidly than tax revenues to pay 
for them, and populations are aging, each of which increases the burden on 
the public sector. In the United States, we speak of a Medicare crisis and a 
Social Security crisis, where the government will no longer be able to meet 
its health care bills. Other countries have an aging crisis, or an old age in- 
surance crisis. 
There is no doubt that medical care costs are certain to increase. But by 
how much? What is the magnitude of reform that is needed? Those are the 
questions I address in this paper. 
To answer them, I develop a forecast model of medical spending in Or- 
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) coun- 
tries. The model uses as inputs current spending on medical care and the 
demographic mix of the population as it stands now and as it is expected to 
change. The model estimates the share of medical spending in gross do- 
mestic product (GDP) in the future. Because most countries pay for the 
bulk of medical services publicly, this forecast is closely related to the in- 
crease in the public-sector financing burden that can be expected. 
The results yield several important conclusions. First, all OECD coun- 
tries can expect an increase in the cost of medical care over time. On the ba- 
sis of demographic change alone, the typical country can expect medical 
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care to increase by 2.2 percent of GDP in the next thirty years and by 3.6 
percent of GDP in the next half century. Including continued technologi- 
cal innovation in medicine at the rate experienced in the past raises the pro- 
jected increase in the next thirty years to 5.7 percent of GDP. Interestingly, 
the data suggest that the medical care problem is about equally split be- 
tween the consequences of aging and the consequences of technological 
change in medical treatments. 
The coming medical care burden differs substantially across countries. 
The countries that will be hardest hit by demographic change are Spain, 
Switzerland, the Czech Republic, Italy, and Greece. All of these countries 
have very low fertility rates and large projected increases in life expectancy. 
Demographic change will raise medical spending in these countries by 5 to 
6 percent of GDP. Japan and the United States rank in the middle on this 
scale, ninth and twelfth, respectively, out of  twenty-nine countries (ex- 
pected increases of 4.4 and 3.7 percent). The least affected countries in- 
clude Turkey, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Mexico, with an ex- 
pected increase of 2 percent or less. 
Accounting  for technological change has a material impact on these 
rankings. Most importantly, it raises the financing burden in the United 
States. The United States spends more than other countries do on medical 
care and has the most technologically advanced medical system. Thus, if 
technology increases costs at the same rate everywhere, the United States 
will be particularly hard hit. Using historical growth rates of medical costs 
as a guide to the future, the projected increase in medical spending in the 
United States over the next thirty years is close to 10 percent. The increase 
in Japan will be over 6 percent of GDP. 
These are sizeable estimates, although perhaps not cataclysmic. I show 
that affording such increases will require reductions in the growth of non- 
medical consumption, but not absolute declines in the level of such spend- 
ing. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 3.1 lays out the nature of the 
medical care problem and the structure of the simulation model. Section 
3.2 describes the consequences of demographic change alone. Section 3.3 
then adds in technological change in medical treatments. Section 3.4 dis- 
cusses the implications for the affordability of medical care overall, and 
section 3.5 concludes. 
3.1  Forecasting Medical Care Spending 
The need to forecast medical spending is obvious. Medical care is 10 per- 
cent of GDP or more in most developed countries and is growing rapidly. 
Most of this medical care is paid for by the public sector (over 80 percent 
in most countries). Thus, public concern about rising costs is particularly 
high. But medical costs are a concern in the private sector as well. In- An International Look at the Medical Care Financing Problem  71 
creased medical spending involves painful adjustments as families shift 
their spending allocations among different goods and businesses pass on 
the costs of medical care to workers. None of this implies that medical 
spending increases are bad, but it indicates why we need to know what the 
medical burden will be. 
Forecasting medical spending is simple in some ways and horribly com- 
plex in others. To  understand the issues, I start with a truism: medical 
spending as a share of GDP is the division of per capita medical spending 
by  per capita output. To forecast the share of GDP devoted to medical 
care, therefore, I forecast these two terms. 
Start with medical spending. Per capita medical spending is the product 
of the number of people at each age times spending at that age, divided by 
the number of people in the country as a whole. Denoting age groups with 
the subscript a, this can be expressed as 
Spend, 
Per capita medical spending = ca  Pop,  * 
(1)  Total Pop ' 
To forecast medical spending, therefore, we need projections of the popu- 
lation and spending at each age. 
The United Nations publishes projections of population by age (United 
Nations Population Division 1998). The United Nations divides the popu- 
lation into people below age fifteen, people aged fifteen to sixty-four, and 
people over the age of sixty-five. I use these population projections at dec- 
adal intervals through 2050. 
Forecasting spending in each age group is more difficult. Relative med- 
ical spending by  age differs across countries, and the growth of overall 
spending differs across countries. Aging is more of a problem in countries 
where medical spending is more highly tilted to the aged and in countries 
where overall cost growth is more rapid. It is not clear what assumptions 
about spending growth are reasonable. For these simulations, I make rela- 
tively simple assumptions, based on data availability as much as economic 
theory. 
The first assumption is about relative medical spending at each age. 
There is not a lot of data on relative medical spending by age in different 
countries, as the microdata that are needed for this analysis are not always 
available. For simplicity, I assume that the age distribution of  medical 
spending is the same in all countries and is equal to the distribution in the 
United States. In the United States, the elderly spend 3 times what the adult 
population does on medical care, and the young spend 60 percent less than 
the adult population. As populations age, therefore, there will be a mono- 
tonic increase in spending. 
Almost certainly, the elderly share in the United States is higher than in 
most other countries, as the technological intensity of the US. system is 
particularly brought to bear at older ages. If other countries keep spending 72  David M. Cutler 
for the elderly down in the future, this would blunt the impact of aging in 
those countries. Conversely, if spending on the elderly rises in other coun- 
tries, to match the technological intensity of the United States, most other 
countries could face an even greater spending burden than my  forecasts 
suggest. 
I further assume that relative spending will remain the same at different 
ages in the future. In the United States, spending on the aged has increased 
more rapidly than spending on the nonaged, as technological change has 
tilted toward the elderly (Cutler and Meara 1998,2001). In the absence of 
better information, however, there is little ability to forecast continued 
changes in this ratio. 
The second assumption is about the impact of medical technology on 
costs. As the capabilities of medicine expand, what will happen to overall 
medical spending? It is clear that increases in the technical sophistication 
of medicine have been a fundamental factor in rising medical costs in the 
past, far surpassing the roles of increased income, more generous insur- 
ance, and an older population on medical costs (Newhouse 1992; Techni- 
cal Review Panel on the Medicare Trustees' Reports 2000). The reason is 
clear-medical  technology moved diseases from untreatable to treatable. 
For example, coronary bypass surgery replaced watchful waiting as a pri- 
mary therapy for people with a heart attack in the 1980s and 1990s. Mon- 
itoring without intervention is cheap; bypass surgery is expensive. Hence, 
developing bypass surgery led to increased medical spending. 
There is no indication that technological change is becoming less rapid. 
If anything, it is speeding up with the genomic revolution and advances in 
traditional therapies such as surgeries and diagnostic equipment (JAMA 
2001). Thus, one might expect that medical spending will continue to in- 
crease. 
But the translation between technological change and spending is more 
complex. Where lack of treatment was once the norm, today most condi- 
tions are treated in some fashion. As a result, in the future, new treatments 
will increasingly substitute for older ones. If the newer procedures  are 
cheaper than the older procedures they replace, the use of new procedures 
may not lead to as rapid cost increase. To follow the heart attack example, 
angioplasty recently joined bypass surgery as a recognized therapy for 
heart attacks. Some angioplasties substitute for bypass surgery. Because 
angioplasty is cheaper than bypass surgery, the use of this technology saves 
money in some cases (Cutler and Huckman 2003).' 
The ultimate impact of technological change on medical spending de- 
pends on the relative importance of these treatment expansion and treat- 
ment substitution effects. It will not necessarily be  the case that medical 
1. In total, though, angioplasty led to more spending, as it substituted for medical man- 
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spending continues to rise as medicine becomes more technologically so- 
phisticated. 
Most forecasts suggest that technological change will  increase to in- 
crease spending, however. A consensus estimate is that medical spending 
will  increase 1 percent more rapidly than GDP in the next few decades 
(Medicare Technical Advisory Panel 2000). I use this estimate in my simu- 
lations. 
Translating this estimate internationally  requires additional assump- 
tions. Medical spending is lower in other countries than in the United 
States. If medical costs increase 1 percent more rapidly than GDP every- 
where, the dollar increase will be smaller abroad than in the United States. 
Thus, there will be a growing divergence between medical costs in different 
countries. Is this possible? In principle, yes. Even though medical technol- 
ogy has expanded in all countries over the past half century, the increase 
has been far larger in the United States than elsewhere, as figure 3.1 shows. 
The United States has thus become even more of an outlier than it was al- 
ready. For lack of a better alternative, I assume this will continue in the fu- 
ture. One issue for future exploration is the implications of assuming some 
convergence in spending. 
In addition to forecasting medical spending, we  need to forecast per 
capita income. We can express per capita income using a formula similar 
to equation (1): 
Output, 
Per capita income = xc,  Workers, . 
Total Pop 
A complete projection of  equation (2) would forecast the number of 
workers at each age along with output of those workers. No projections 
that detailed are available. I thus make simpler assumptions. I assume that 
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Fig. 3.1 
Source: OECD (2002). 






labor force participation is confined to the fifteen- to sixty-four-year-old 
population and that labor force participation in that group remains con- 
stant. Further, I assume that output for all workers rises at the same rate. 
For these simulations, the rate of increase is immaterial; the key is the diff- 
erential between health care cost growth and output growth. As discussed 
previously, I assume this differential is 1 percent. 
Effectively, these assumptions mean that changes in output are driven 
entirely by  changes in share of the population that is working age. As a 
first-pass simulation model, this does not seem unreasonable. 
3.2  Demographics and Medical Spending 
To understand the medical care problem, I start with some basic demo- 
graphic information across countries. The share of the population that is 
elderly varies greatly across the developed world. Figure 3.2 shows this 
variation. Thirteen percent of the OECD as a whole is over the age of sixty- 
five. Italy has the largest elderly share, at 18 percent, with Greece, Sweden, 
Japan, and Spain also being very high. For all of the worries about aging in 
the United States, the United States population is not very elderly (by de- 
veloped country standards); 12 percent of the U.S. population is over age 
sixty-five. 
Fig. 3.2  Elderly share of the population, 2000 
Source: United Nations Population Division (1998). An International Look at the Medical Care Financing Problem  75 
The major driver of aging is fertility. Most countries have fertility rates 
that are below replacement levels (about 2.1 births per woman). Italy, for 
example, has a birth rate of 1.2 babies per woman, and Japan is 1.4. Birth 
rates this low inevitably imply an aging population. Added to the low fer- 
tility rate are increases in longevity at older ages. In the United States, the 
average forty-five-year-old lives nearly five years longer now than in 1950. 
Finally, immigration rates are low in most OECD countries. Immigration 
from poor to rich countries does not change the world's share of elderly 
people, but it does change the share in any particular country. A country 
with low net immigration will be increasingly older. 
The net impact of these demographic changes is a projection of sub- 
stantial increases in the elderly population over time. Figure 3.3 shows the 
forecast increase in the elderly share between 2000 and 2050. The expected 
increase is large in all countries. The highest rates of increase are forecast 
in Spain, the Czech Republic, Korea, and Italy. These countries will see in- 
creases in the elderly population of over 15 percentage points if nothing 
else intervenes. The average OECD country will experience an increase of 





Fig. 3.3  Forecast change in elderly share of the population, 2000-2050 
Source: United Nations Population Division (1998). 76  David M. Cutler 
Kingdom and the United States, for example) will have increases of 9 per- 
centage points. 
One sunny side of aging is fewer children, and thus more workers among 
the nonelderly population (Cutler et al. 1990). This is not enough to over- 
whelm the effect of increased elderly shares on medical spending, however. 
To examine the effect of demographic changes on the medical system, I 
simulate spending assuming no change in per person medical care utiliza- 
tion in the next half century. While this is obviously unrealistic, it provides 
a benchmark to assess the importance of demographic changes. 
The results of the simulation are shown in figure 3.4. Note the mean first. 
In the average OECD country, demographic change alone will increase 
medical spending as a share of GDP by 3.6 percentage points in the next 
half century. This is  a large increase, but perhaps not insurmountable. 
Most of this increase is in the next thirty years, where the increase will av- 
erage 2.2 percentage points. The retirement of the baby boom generation 
will lead the procession into an era of more rapidly rising medical costs. 
The ranking of countries is similar in figure 3.4 as in figure 3.3, but the 
two are not exactly the same. The countries with the biggest increase are 
V 
Fig. 3.4  Forecast change in medical care share of GDP, demographic change only, 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Spain, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, Italy, and Greece. All of these 
countries will have medical spending increases of over 5 percent of GDP, 
based on demographic change alone. The United States is higher ranked in 
figure 3.4 than in figure 3.3. Because medical spending in the United States 
is so high, the same amount of demographic change has a larger impact on 
per capita spending than it does elsewhere. The forecast increase in  the 
United States is 3.7 percentage points. In Japan, the forecast increase is 4.4 
percentage points. 
At the bottom of the list are Turkey and the United Kingdom. The com- 
paratively low rate of aging in the United Kingdom combined with a low 
level of medical spending blunts the impact of demographic change on 
medical costs. But even in the United Kingdom, demographic change will 
lead to a 2 percent increase in the share of medical care in GDP. It is clear 
that demographic change will present a financing hurdle for all developed 
countries. 
3.3  Including Technological Change 
A more complete simulation includes the effects of technological change 
as well as population aging. As noted previously, I assume that medical 
costs increase at all ages by  1 percent per year above the rate of per capita 
GDP  growth. Forecast out forever, this is clearly unrealistic; it implies that 
medical care would ultimately account for all of GDP. Thus, some limit on 
the time period for forecasting is needed. 
To illustrate the importance of technical change, I consider a more lim- 
ited simulation of medical spending in the next thirty years, to 2030. A 
steady increase in costs over the next three decades is (perhaps) more real- 
istic than assuming the same increase over the next fifty years. 
Figure 3.5 shows the resulting estimates of the change in medical spend- 
ing relative to GDP. Even in the next thirty years, the simulation implies 
large increases in medical spending. In the average OECD country, the in- 
crease in GDP share is 5.7 percentage points. That is greater than the 2.2 
percentage points attributable to demographic change in this time period, 
although  the  additional  part  due to technical  change  (3.5 percentage 
points) is not much larger than the demographic component. 
Most notable in figure 3.5 are the enormously high increases projected 
in Switzerland and the United States. Medical spending in each of those 
countries is projected to increase by over 9 percent, to levels of about 25 
percent of GDP. The medical cost problem is more severe in these countries 
because medical spending in those countries is so high. Hence, continued 
increases in costs result in disproportionately large increases in the medical 
sector. In Japan, the increase in the medical care burden is between 6 and 
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Fig. 3.5  Forecast change in medical care share of GDP, demographic and health 
cost changes, 2000-2030 
Source: Author's calculations. 
3.4  Is Such Spending Sustainable? 
The increase in medical spending will have several implications for the 
economy. The first issue is whether such cost increases are good or harm- 
ful. Would society be harmed by spending so much on medical care? 
Clearly, people can have different views about this. My belief is that in- 
creases in spending of this magnitude are affordable. Recall that economic 
growth is forecast to be relatively robust over the next half century. Hence, 
the size of the economic pie is expanding. The increase in medical care rel- 
ative to GDP implies that the medical care slice of the pie is getting bigger. 
But the medical slice is not growing more rapidly than the pie itself. Even 
in these simulations, nonmedical consumption is still increasing over time. 
Figure 3.6 shows this result analytically. I simulate nonmedical  con- 
sumption assuming GDP increases by 2 percent annually and the differ- 
ential between medical and nonmedical consumption is either 0 percent, 
1 percent, or 2 percent annually. In ease case, nonmedical consumption 
rises from 2000 through 2050. The increase is significantly  larger in the case 
of no excess medical care cost growth (nearly 70 percent larger), but con- 
sumption increases in all scenarios. Inherently, continued medical care An International Look at the Medical Care Financing Problem  79 
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Year 
+0%  differential +1%  differentlal -2%  differentlal 
Fig. 3.6  Effect of increased medical costs on nonmedical consumption 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
cost growth involves is less rapid increase in nonmedical consumption, but 
not an absolute decline. That does not seem implausible. 
The statement that we can afford to spend more on medical care does not 
mean that we should do so. Most Americans could afford a large screen TV, 
but not everyone chooses to do so. Other goods and services are important 
as well. We thus need to evaluate whether money spent on medical care is 
worth the expense. 
This question cannot be answered using the simulations here. These 
simulations show what we will pay for medical advance, but not what we 
will get for it. To examine what we  will get in return, we need to value the 
health improvements that result from medicine. 
I have done this in other work (Cutler 2003). My conclusion is that med- 
ical spending is almost certainly worth the cost. We  spend more on med- 
ical care, but we  get even more in return. As an example, consider treat- 
ment changes in cardiovascular disease. As noted previously, the average 
forty-five-year-old is expected to live another five years now compared to 
1950. Other work that I have done suggests that about three years of this 
improvement comes from medical advance in the treatment of coronary 
heart disease. These advances are of several forms: intensive medical care 
that saves the lives of people having a heart attack or other acute incident 
(bypass surgery, angioplasty, thrombolytic drugs, beta-blockers, cardiac 
catheterization, and so on) and medications taken on a regular basis that 
prevent the  incidence of acute events or lessen their  long-term conse- 
quences (antihypertensive medications, cholesterol lowering drugs, and 
the like). Together with public health improvements such as reduced smok- 
ing and lower fat diets, these changes have led to significant increases in 
longevity. 
Those three years of life came at a cost, however. I estimate that the av- 80  David M. Cutler 
erage forty-five-year-old today will spend $30,000 more on cardiovascular 
disease over his remaining life than the equivalent person would have in 
1950. 
Hence, the tradeoff: $30,000 of spending for a three additional years of 
life. Is it worth it? Almost any sensible value for a year of life suggests that 
this is a good investment. A common metric in economics is that a year of 
life is worth about $100,000. In present value, therefore, the three years of 
additional life from medical advances in the treatment of cardiovascular 
disease is worth about $120,000 per person. This is four times the addi- 
tional cost. The implication of this calculation is that medical spending is 
not bad. It is burdensome, to be sure, but not harmful overall. 
3.5  Summary and Implications 
The central issue in medical care is not whether we  can afford to spend 
more on medicine or whether it is a good idea to do so, but how we should 
pay for it. There are three possible ways to pay for the coming medical care 
burden. The optimal tradeoff between them likely differs from country to 
country. To illustrate the issues involved, I focus on the possibilities in the 
United States. 
The first option is to increase revenues from people currently alive to pay 
for medical care in the future. Money put aside now and saved until later 
can significantly reduce the burden of spending down the road. The in- 
crease in funds today can be either additional taxes, or (forced) private sav- 
ings; economically, they are the same. 
The preceding simulations give some guide as to what tax increase is nec- 
essary. If the government were to pay for all of the forecast increase, gov- 
ernment spending in the United States would rise by  about 9 percent of 
GDP  in the coming three decades. If enacted immediately, a tax increase of 
a few percent of GDP would be needed to cover the deficit. Such a tax in- 
crease is large but not unheard of. 
A second method is to wait until the future and then tax working gener- 
ations to pay for the increased medical care burden that future elderly will 
incur. The simulations again show the size of the tax increase ultimately 
needed-9  percent of GDP. That is a hefty amount. The efficiency conse- 
quences of such a tax would be a major issue. 
The third solution is to make people pay more for medical care when 
they use services, especially at older ages. Many elderly in the United States 
face no cost sharing when using services. While Medicare requires such 
costs, a large number of the elderly purchase supplemental insurance or 
have such insurance from a former employer to offset the required cost 
sharing (Cutler and Wise, chap. 2 in this volume). As a result, care at the 
time of use is generally costless, and like all free services is overused. Mak- 
ing people pay more at the time of use is a viable option, although one An International Look at the Medical Care Financing Problem  81 
would need to account for the welfare loss from increased risk bearing 
along with the gains from reduced moral hazard. A system with appropri- 
ate cost sharing would cost less than the current one. 
Evaluating these different options is  beyond the scope of  this paper. 
With  the  near  certainty of  increases in medical costs in  the  next few 
decades, however, governments will increasingly have to face the issue of 
paying for an older population that uses increasingly intensive, and expen- 
sive, medical services. 
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